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PREFACE
The G-24 Discussion Paper Series is a collection of research papers prepared
under the UNCTAD Project of Technical Support to the Intergovernmental Group of
Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs (G-24). The G-24 was established in
1971 with a view to increasing the analytical capacity and the negotiating strength of the
developing countries in discussions and negotiations in the international financial
institutions.  The G-24 is the only formal developing-country grouping within the IMF
and the World Bank. Its meetings are open to all developing countries.
The G-24 Project, which is administered by UNCTAD’s Macroeconomic and
Development Policies Branch, aims at enhancing the understanding of policy makers in
developing countries of the complex issues in the international monetary and financial
system, and at raising awareness outside developing countries of the need to introduce a
development dimension into the discussion of international financial and institutional
reform.
The research carried out under the project is coordinated by Professor Dani Rodrik,
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. The research papers are
discussed among experts and policy makers at the meetings of  the G-24 Technical Group,
and provide inputs to the meetings of the G-24 Ministers and Deputies in their preparations
for negotiations and discussions in the framework of the IMF’s International Monetary
and Financial Committee (formerly Interim Committee) and the Joint IMF/IBRD
Development Committee, as well as in other forums. Previously, the research papers for
the G-24 were published by UNCTAD in the collection International Monetary and
Financial Issues for the 1990s.  Between 1992 and 1999 more than 80 papers were
published in 11 volumes of this collection, covering a wide range of monetary and financial
issues of major interest to developing countries. Since the beginning of 2000 the studies
are published jointly by UNCTAD and the Center for International Development at
Harvard University in the G-24 Discussion Paper Series.
The Project of Technical Support to the G-24 receives generous financial support
from the International Development Research Centre of Canada and the Governments of
Denmark and the Netherlands, as well as contributions from the countries participating
in the meetings of the  G-24.COMMENTARY ON THE FINANCIAL
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Abstract
This Report consists principally of recommendations and guidelines. It acknowledges the
threat to the benefits of a liberal global regime for international capital flows posed by their
instability. Concern is expressed as to risks to stability linked to reliance on short-term borrowing
from banks, the interaction between different financial risks, and faultlines in global financial
markets resulting from firms’ own hedging and risk management that may be difficult to identify
in advance. But, in general, the Report’s recommendations focus mainly on changes in recipient
countries in practices with regard to the monitoring and management of financial risks, rather
than on changes in the main sources of international lending and investment. Those directed at
the latter would require no major deviations from the thrust of existing policies in the countries
concerned. In particular, the Report does not discuss proposals put forward in some quarters
for substantial improvements in transparency regarding operations in currency markets widely
considered to have contributed to recent episodes of instability. On the subject of controls over
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I. Introduction
The Report of the Financial Stability Forum’s
Working Group on Capital Flows (henceforth the
Report) consists principally of a long and carefully
annotated set of recommendations and guidelines. It
begins by acknowledging the threat to the benefits
of a liberal global regime for international capital
flows posed by their instability. The Report is con-
cerned with risks to stability linked to short-term
borrowing, and its recommendations under this head-
ing include a change at the level of the sources of
capital flows in the form of removal in the revised
Basle Capital Accord of the incentive to short-term
bank lending in the 1988 Accord. But in general the
Report’s recommendations focus mainly on changes
in recipient countries in practices with regard to the
monitoring and management of financial risks rather
than changes in the main sources of international
lending and investment. Those directed at the latter
would require no major deviations from the thrust of
existing policies in the countries concerned. In par-
ticular, the Report fails to discuss proposals recently
put forward in some quarters for substantial improve-
ments in transparency regarding operations in
currency markets widely considered to have contrib-
uted to recent episodes of instability. The subject of
controls over capital movements is broached but the
Report limits itself to capital inflows, and the case
for these is somewhat cautiously accepted.
II. The working group’s mandate and
the Report’s principal focus
To some extent the focus of the Report can be
explained through the Working Group’s terms of
reference. These were as follows: (i) to evaluate pru-
dential policies, regulations and risk-management
practices in borrowing countries that may help to
reduce systemic risks associated with the build-up
of external indebtedness; (ii) to identify regulatory
and other factors responsible for an unwarranted bias
in favour of (i.e. incentives to) short-term flows, and
to recommend offsetting actions; (iii) to review
progress in improving the adequacy and timeliness
of data and reporting systems needed for monitoring
the risks associated with capital flows, and to indi-
cate areas for improvement; and (iv) to evaluate other
potential measures in both debtor and creditor coun-
* The author is grateful to Dr. Aziz Ali Mohammed for providing the inspiration for the writing of this paper, though he should
not be held responsible for the result.
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tries to reduce the volatility of capital flows and its
adverse consequences for systemic stability.
Although the mandate under (iv) is open-ended,
these terms of reference help to explain the report’s
focus on transparency, risk monitoring and manage-
ment, and bank supervision, and its primary concern
with practices in borrowing countries. Indeed, the
Report acknowledges that the Working Group con-
sidered beyond its scope the framework of macro-
economic policy, aspects of the legal infrastructure
such as the law of contracts and insolvency, and
highly leveraged institutions and offshore financial
centres (both of which subjects are covered in other
reports of the Financial Stability Forum). Some im-
plications of this focus, in particular the consequent
omission or downplaying of important topics, will
be taken up in the commentary which follows.
III.  The Report’s perception of recent
experience
In section II concerning the nature of the prob-
lem, after noting the considerable variation in the
levels of development of their financial systems
among countries receiving foreign private capital, the
Report declares that it is principally concerned with
those “with relatively small but open financial mar-
kets”, a description which would include most of the
recipients of substantial amounts of such capital
which have been directly involved in, or the subject
of special attention during, recent international fi-
nancial crises. The features of recent experience
singled out by the Report are primarily, as one might
expect, those with a connection to its recommenda-
tions. Most of these features now figure in a standard
way in accounts of this experience, and include the
vulnerability of countries with large accumulations
of short-term debt owing to the associated liquidity
and roll-over risks, similar dangers associated with
certain categories of portfolio investment, economic
actors’ inadequate risk management, and policies in
both source and recipient countries which are con-
ducive to the accumulation of short-term or volatile
capital inflows.
The incentives to short-term capital flows in
provisions of the 1988 Basle Capital Accord have
already been mentioned, and an appendix to the Re-
port gives further instances of policies involving such
incentives in recipient countries. In the Republic of
Korea, for example, according to the Report, the cau-
tious liberalization of capital transactions of the
1990s led, in practice, to a bias in favour of short-
term borrowing by banks owing to continuing tighter
control over direct borrowing by corporations and
continuing “window guidance” applied by the Bank
of Korea to medium- and long-term borrowing by
banks. In Thailand the establishment of the Bang-
kok International Banking Facility (BIBF) in 1992
and of the Provincial International Banking Facility
(PIBF) in 1995 served as an encouragement to short-
term bank borrowing owing to the exemption from
controls of certain transactions such as overdrafts and
liabilities from currency trade, international trade
financing, and non-resident deposits at BIBF banks.
In Indonesia restrictions on banks’ foreign borrow-
ing in the period preceding the financial crisis
excluded short-term trade financing and borrowing
for certain other purposes such as by private compa-
nies to finance private projects unrelated to public
entities as well as borrowing required for certain
operations in money and capital markets. The Re-
port also notes that differential regulatory ratios (such
as those for reserve and liquid-asset requirements)
favouring foreign-currency and non-resident depos-
its in some countries have provided an obvious
incentive to short-term foreign borrowing. Various
techniques involving the provision to foreign lend-
ers of exchange-rate guarantees are also cited as
having contributed to the accumulation of foreign
borrowing (and not only at short maturities), includ-
ing the dollar-indexing of government debt, forward
cover by the central bank for authorized short-term
external borrowing by banks, and (as part of sterili-
zation operations) the availability through the central
bank of foreign-exchange swaps at a forward rate
close to the spot rate (an important feature of
pre-crisis policy in Thailand). The appendix also
mentions various other policies connected to the
maintenance of stable exchange rates and the steri-
lization of capital inflows which are conducive
to borrowing driven by international interest-rate
arbitrage.
One of the outcomes of recent financial crises
has been increased attention to stocks of external and
foreign-currency assets and liabilities. As the Report
puts it (para. 29): “while a typical manifestation of
an external crisis is a reversal of capital flows, the
risks that give rise to the crisis often lie in the struc-
ture of the stocks of external or foreign currency
assets and liabilities that have accumulated over
time”. Implicit in this recognition of the importance
of such stock data for policy towards capital move-
ments is the need to address shortcomings of existing
systems of financial reporting. The Report refers
(paras. 25–26) to some of the problems under this3 Commentary on the Financial Stability Forum’s Report of the Working Group on Capital Flows
heading: for example, it acknowledges the pressures
on external payments which can result from the
adjustment of derivative positions which are off-
balance-sheet and not always adequately covered by
accounting rules and which, even if disclosed, are
capable of blurring distinctions between different
categories of exposure (such as those between short
and longer term). But, as explained further below,
neither in its identification of problems posed by the
current regime for international capital movements
nor in its policy recommendations does the Report
fully address issues that have been raised by a number
of developing countries concerning the opaque na-
ture of positions and operations of financial and
non-financial firms which can be a source of unpre-
dictable pressures in currency markets.
The Report follows various recent commentary
on instability in international financial markets in
acknowledging that hedging and other practices make
many of the system’s fault lines difficult to identify
in advance.1 As the Report puts it:
Certain commonly employed risk management
techniques … can have the effect of adding to
the volatility of both prices and flows in the
international capital market … That is, inves-
tors acquire or dispose of claims whose risk
characteristics and price history resemble those
of the asset being proxied but where the mar-
ket is deeper, more liquid, or subject to fewer
restrictions and controls. Such behaviour was
one of the factors behind the large fluctuations
in capital flows to South Africa and several
countries in Eastern Europe around the time
of the Asian crisis.
In the context of more recent events attention has
also been drawn (though this example is not cited in
the Report) to the way in which Brazilian bonds have
become an instrument widely used by investors in
emerging markets to hedge positions in the debt of
other countries such as Morocco, Republic of Korea
and Russian Federation (Buckley, 1999: 188–189).
A better idea of the nature of the fault lines of
the international financial system will no doubt be
acquired as transparency is improved along the lines
indicated in the Report. And the risk-management
practices recommended in the Report should be ca-
pable of reducing the dangers associated with these
fault lines, hidden or not. But the Report avoids ac-
knowledging in its observations on recent experience
that the problems it identifies in the functioning of
the existing regime for international capital flows are
integrally linked to the way in which the goal of fi-
nancial liberalization has been pursued since the
1960s by the governments of major industrial coun-
tries, multilateral financial institutions, and private
economic actors, with only limited regard for the
problems which result from the lack of an adequate
framework of policy control.
A fundamental tenet since the 1970s of the
policy of major developed countries regarding the
external financing of developing and, more recently,
transition economies has been promotion of a greatly
expanded role for private sources. Yet, aside from
some initiatives aimed at improving control of credit
risk at the level of individual lending institutions, in
countries which are the source of this financing only
limited attempts have been made to address features
of their lenders’ and investors’ behaviour which are
capable of posing threats not only to the financial
stability of these economies but also to that of inter-
national financial markets more generally. At the
same time developing countries have been caught
up in the associated pressures to liberalize the ac-
cess of foreign capital, and policies adopted in
response to these pressures, though often initially ap-
proved by official circles abroad as well as external
investors, have frequently proved eventually to be
ill-conceived and have contributed on occasion to
financial crises. Yet despite this recent experience,
many of whose adverse effects have been felt most
strongly in recipient developing countries, the inter-
national debate on measures for solving or alleviating
the problems of the regime continues to be domi-
nated by countries responsible for its existing shape
whose agenda for reform is strongly influenced by a
determination to minimize any resulting constraints
on their own firms.
The Report’s failure to escape such a charac-
terization can be linked to the limitations of its terms
of reference (described in section II above). These
exclude macroeconomic issues and policies except
those with an immediate connection to the manage-
ment of foreign exchange reserves and to certain
aspects of external assets and liabilities. A particu-
larly notable omission from the Report’s assessment
of the nature of the problem, which results from this
limitation of its terms of reference, is any discussion
of the influence of global macroeconomic conditions
on the scale and direction of capital movements to
emerging financial markets. The ebb and flow of such
movements is often largely supply-driven, in particu-
lar being strongly affected by monetary conditions
and the liquidity position of mutual funds in the
United States. This was particularly evident, for ex-
ample, in the influx of capital to Latin America during4 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 7
the period of monetary ease in the early 1990s, which
then contracted in response to the lighter conditions
of 1994–1995 and recovered again sharply thereafter.
The Report’s remit did not include macroeconomic
surveillance, but the absence of any discussion of
global conditions gives its observations on the na-
ture of the problem a one-sided air.
IV. Monitoring and managing risk
Section III of the Report (“Monitoring and man-
aging risk”) contains the key recommendations.
These are broken down between recommendations
directed at the public sector, recommendations
directed at the banking sector (regulators and
supervisors as well as firms), and recommendations
directed at the non-bank and corporate sectors. Capi-
tal controls are also covered in section III as a
category of prudential measures. The remaining sec-
tions of the Report are largely subsidiary to section
III. Section V concerns improvements in the data on
external financial positions required for carrying out
the recommendations on monitoring and managing
risk, and section IV the building of institutional ca-
pacity needed for the same purpose. Under the latter
heading is included the development of domestic
securities markets, which is considered to have an
important role in enabling better management of fi-
nancial risks.
At the core of section III’s approach is the coun-
try’s external balance sheet. The Report argues that
a detailed profile of this balance sheet is essential to
monitoring and managing a country’s exposure to
risk. This profile should make it possible to identify
significant exposures to risk linked to different as-
pects of a country’s external financial position
(currency risks, liquidity risks, etc.). The sectoral
breakdown of this national balance sheet would be
decided with this objective in mind, as well as with
that of identifying linkages among sectors capable
of facilitating transfers between them of risk expo-
sures. The sectoral breakdown would thus need to
include the public and private sectors and, within the
latter, the financial and the non-financial corporate,
and possibly the household sectors.
As noted in section III of this paper, the focus
on the elements of national balance sheets in the
Report accords with the conclusions of much com-
mentary on the lessons of the Asian crisis. However,
whilst the importance of balance-sheet data to risk
monitoring and management is incontrovertible, the
question still arises as to how much can be expected
from this front. Improvements in the quality and fre-
quency of financial reporting have made possible
better evaluation of financial risks at the firm level
by lenders and investors (and have probably also fre-
quently been associated with better internal control
of such risks by firms themselves). But there have
been limits to what such improvements have been
able to achieve at the microeconomic level, and simi-
lar limits may also be expected to come into play at
the macroeconomic level. The limits are linked to
both the periodicity and quality of the data used in
putting together a profile of the national balance
sheet.
The Report says in para. 42 that its recommen-
dations do “not warrant fundamentally new data
collection mechanisms” but rather “better use … of
data that are being collected for different purposes,
such as data disseminated to meet disclosure stand-
ards for firms whose assets are publicly traded”. In
most countries there is undeniably scope for consid-
erable improvements in standards of accounting and
financial reporting, as well in the use by the authori-
ties of reports containing data bearing on financial
risk received or available from various different
sources.2 But such improvements cannot eliminate
problems due to the speed with which assets, liabili-
ties and off-balance-sheet positions can now be
transformed, and to intrinsic limits to the extent to
which risk exposure can be inferred from entities’
financial reports, in view of the latitude for obfusca-
tion in existing accounting rules and lags in updating
these rules to cover innovations in financial firms’
practices. Exposures through the interbank market
or otherwise within the financial sector are often cited
to illustrate this point. Segmental reporting,3 for ex-
ample, might have made it possible to identify the
scale of banks’ direct exposure to the Russian Fed-
eration in 1998. But an entity’s total exposure to the
country might also have included indirect exposures
to other financial firms with direct exposure,4 in some
cases in off-balance-sheet forms not to be easily
inferred or quantified from available financial re-
ports.
Unsurprisingly awareness of these limitations
is expressed in the Report as follows: “Taking snap-
shots of the national and key sectoral financial
balance sheets of an economy can potentially pro-
vide an important input to country risk assessments.
But such balance sheets would not of themselves pro-
vide all the information needed to assess sensitivity
to shocks” (para. 43). Thus the Report advocates the
use of stress-testing and scenario analysis5 to sup-5 Commentary on the Financial Stability Forum’s Report of the Working Group on Capital Flows
plement monitoring national balance sheets. Such
testing has an analogue at the firm level. Here, as
part of prudential regulation, increased emphasis is
now put on stress-testing by financial firms to offset
the deficiencies of existing techniques for measur-
ing market and credit risk for purposes such as
internal control and setting capital requirements
that result from reliance on historical data which may
not include large enough shocks or discontinuities.
But stress-testing at national level is considerably
more difficult than at that of the firm as the Report
acknowledges that “The information needed for
stress-testing is not now available … and method-
ologies for stress testing would need to be further
developed” (para. 43). As part of the response to the
difficulty of monitoring and managing risk through
data on national balance sheets one might have ex-
pected here a reference to the need for the authorities
to develop or maintain good sources of market intel-
ligence6 and for a more forceful approach to requiring
information on position-taking in currency markets
and on the offshore activities of financial firms which
may pose a threat to financial stability (a subject
partly addressed in section V of the Report, as dis-
cussed below).
The rest of section III flashes out in sectoral
detail the implications of the Report’s focus on the
management of risk in different components of the
country’s national balance sheet. The principal fo-
cus is on institutions in borrowing countries (in
accordance with the Working Group’s mandate), but
many of the recommendations, particularly those
concerning risk management by private entities,
could just as well contribute to a more stable system
for capital flows through their application in credi-
tor countries.
A. Public sector
The Report is of the view that the traditional
focus of debt management by the public sector has
been too narrow and that the public, like the private,
sector requires an “integrated debt and asset man-
agement strategy” (para. 47). For this purpose it
should adopt several of the techniques of risk man-
agement deployed by, or advocated for the use of,
the private sector, while also giving careful attention
to the many ways in which its financial management
interacts with that of the private sector and affects
economy-wide risks. Under the public sector’s risk
and liquidity management, the Report takes up many
of the subjects traditionally often raised elsewhere
under different headings such as the exchange-rate
regime and reserve policy, the identification of pos-
sible sources of macroeconomic shocks, and the
extent of the sector’s willingness to assume private-
sector financial risks through such facilities as the
provision of forward exchange cover. Under the pub-
lic sector’s role in the reduction or hedging of risks
in the economy, the Report refers (para. 60) to a broad
spectrum of subjects where its decisions are capable
of making a positive contribution: the level of offi-
cial foreign currency reserves and encouragement to
private firms to build up a liquidity buffer; switch-
ing of its borrowing from foreign to domestic
currency and from short-term to longer-term instru-
ments; the purchase of options or contingent credit
lines allowing borrowing at a predetermined rate of
interest in times of crisis; encouraging corporations
to shift their financing away from debt towards eq-
uity; (for commodity-importing countries) buying
forward contracts or call options fixing prices; and
(presumably for commodity-exporting countries) is-
suing bonds whose cost of servicing and repayment
is linked to export prices. The Report nonetheless
cautions (para. 64) against excessive expectations
concerning the advantages of employment by the
public sector of complex financial instruments to
manage risk caused by such factors as the newness
of the markets for these instruments and consequent
uncertainties concerning price-setting and liquidity,
counterparty credit risk, and the difficulty of design-
ing hedging strategies for risks which are hard to
define or to disaggregate into components for which
hedging techniques exist.
The focus of this discussion of the role of the
public sector might be described as the identifica-
tion and reduction of general vulnerability to certain
risks. Several subjects which one might expect to
see included, had the discussion also been more con-
cerned with responding to the threat of imminent or
looming financial crises, are not addressed. One, for
example, is the need for information on private eco-
nomic actors’ large positions (a matter already
mentioned above). Another is capital controls and
other macroeconomic policies which can be useful
in handling instability in capital movements and cur-
rency markets. As mentioned earlier, the Report goes
along with the increasingly conventional wisdom
since the Asian crisis that controls on capital inflows
can be a useful policy tool. But rather than taking
them up under risk monitoring and management by
the public sector – which many would regard as a
more natural place – the Report relegates their dis-
cussion to the end of section III under the separate
heading of such controls as prudential measures. This6 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 7
may reflect the still ambivalent attitude in many of-
ficial circles towards acceptance of capital controls.7
It is instructive to contrast this ambivalence with
the very different line on the subject in an EEC di-
rective of 1972 (“on regulating international capital
flows and neutralizing their undesirable effects on
domestic liquidity”8), which can be regarded as ex-
pressing at the time the collective view of a major
group of industrial countries as to the appropriate
way to protect the newly instituted “snake” arrange-
ment of narrow margins among the exchange rates
of EEC currencies and, more generally, the exchange
rates agreed at the Smithsonian meeting of Decem-
ber 1971 against pressures resulting from large capital
flows. Recital l of the directive refers to “exception-
ally large capital movements” which “have caused
serious disturbances in the monetary situation and
in economic trends in Member States”, and recital 3
to the need for Member States to “adopt measures
immediately in order to have available, should occa-
sion arise, the appropriate instruments for purpose
of discouraging exceptionally large capital move-
ments …, and of neutralizing their effects on the
domestic monetary situation”. Article 1 of the
directive defines the appropriate instruments as fol-
lows:
(a) For effective regulation of international
capital flows:
• rules governing investment on the
money market and payment of inter-
est on deposits by non-residents;
• regulation of loans and credits which
are not related to commercial trans-
actions or to provision of services and
are granted by non-residents to resi-
dents …
(b) For the neutralization of those effects pro-
duced by international capital flows on
domestic liquidity which are considered
undesirable:
• regulation of the net external position
of credit institutions;
• fixing minimum reserve ratios, in
particular for the holdings of non-
residents.
As one reads or re-reads the text of this directive,
one may well ask the question whether the risks to
which it was a response have greatly changed in the
interim, or whether the different thrust of interna-
tional policy which emerged subsequently was not
more a reflection of intellectual fashion.
B. The banking sector
In its sectoral recommendations for banking the
Report covers not only the internal controls of firms
but also supervisory practices. In its prefatory re-
marks here the Report lays particular emphasis on
the examples provided by recent crises of ways in
which different financial risks are often closely con-
nected. As the Report puts it (para. 74):
Exposure to credit risk is increasingly driven
by movements in market prices, which them-
selves depend on the liquidity of these mar-
kets. Market risk has long been acknowledged
to entail two components: general market risk
and specific market risk, the latter being very
close to credit risk; but it increasingly includes
a liquidity dimension as well, especially when
tightened liquidity results in abnormal prices.
Conversely, liquidity risk is linked to market
risk and, in extreme cases, to credit risk alike.
As the industry and regulators evaluate a
bank’s overall capacity to withstand shocks,
each risk should be considered in the context
of the bank’s overall portfolio, no longer in
isolation.
Presumably in view of the unmanageably large range
of subjects for banks’ own risk management which
such remarks potentially open up, the Report limits
itself to those of liquidity and foreign exchange risk
and to the credit risk arising from capital flows.
Recent financial crises are replete with instances
when shortages of liquidity led to outsize movements
in the prices of financial instruments or even diffi-
culties in pricing at all such instruments (and thus
also valuing the trading books of traders and firms),
conditions which are potential triggers for financial
panic. Shortages of liquidity can also lead to roll-
over risk for economic agents’ short-term financing
and to re-evaluations of credit risk, both of which
are potential sources of cumulative instability ow-
ing to links among firms. But the Report does not
come up with any novel departures in its recommen-
dations: the setting-out of basic principles for
management of liquidity by banks in a recent paper
of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(BCBS, 2000) is welcomed; further stress-testing is
supported to obtain a better idea of the way in which
liquidity risk is related to other financial risks; and
better disclosure is recommended of banks’ liquid-
ity policies and positions in their financial reports
together with a requirement for auditors and super-
visors to validate the assumptions underlying these
policies.7 Commentary on the Financial Stability Forum’s Report of the Working Group on Capital Flows
In its remarks on credit risk the Report places
special emphasis on the way in which large move-
ments in exchange rates and the prices of financial
assets have translated into increased credit risk dur-
ing recent financial crises in emerging-market
economies. The Report does not pretend that there
is any silver bullet available to deal with the result-
ing problems. The management of credit risk
ultimately depends on good credit assessment and
control by banks and by other investors and lenders,
and these in turn can be facilitated by improved dis-
closure (though it should be recalled that there are
limits to what can reasonably be expected on this
front, as discussed earlier). Even in industrial coun-
tries management by banks of credit risk suffers from
many weaknesses. As a senior executive at a large
Australian bank with extensive practical experience
of different aspects of banks’ capital allocation puts
it in a new book: “Although this is by far the biggest
risk class for most banks, and has been around since
the start of banking, techniques and understanding
still lag behind the market risk class … This is de-
spite the fact that history shows that it is bad
management of credit risk which is most likely to
lead to bank failure” (Matten, 2000: 185). Some of
the most important problems to be confronted here
involve concentrations of credit risk, which are of-
ten determined by correlations among the positions
of economic agents and sectors which are hard to
identify until they actually manifest themselves – and
hence have been dubbed in some cases “latent con-
centration risk” (Caouette et al., 1998: 91 and 240).
Recent financial crises have provided many exam-
ples of how the credit risks of economic agents are
correlated as a result of factors other than high mu-
tual financial exposures.
The discussion of the credit risk associated with
capital flows is one where the focus on borrowers
mandated by the Report’s terms of reference leads
to the absence of a serious, separate treatment of
deficiencies in lenders’ credit controls (though some
of its recommendations apply equally well to lend-
ers). Yet such deficiencies are a major feature of
international debt crises. Observers of the crisis of
the 1980s remarked on the way in which it was pre-
ceded by aggressive selling of loans to developing-
country borrowers, often accompanied by wholly
inadequate analysis of their capacity to repay.9 Simi-
lar sloppy application of credit analysis and standards
seems to have accompanied much lending to emerg-
ing-market countries in the 1990s, leading to losses
for foreign banks during the Asian crisis, for exam-
ple, of approximately $20 billion, according to some
estimates.10 The way in which credit guidelines are
applied in banks’ lending decisions and the balance
in these decisions between conservatism and aggres-
siveness (sometimes called a bank’s “credit culture”)
remains a little researched subject. A more complete
treatment of ways to control instability in cross-bor-
der lending than that covered by the Report would
need to address certain behaviour patterns in banks
in countries which are the main sources of interna-
tional capital flows as well as ways to improve their
decision-making regarding credit allocation.
Many of the Report’s remarks on banking regu-
lation and supervision consist of endorsement of
ongoing international initiatives to improve practices
in this area. Particular issues addressed include
banks’ provisioning practices (where higher general
provisions are supported as a way of alleviating cy-
clical contractions in lending due to declines in
borrowers’ creditworthiness), on-site supervision (the
frequency of which is subject to considerable varia-
tion amongst countries but the importance of which
is endorsed here11), and greater use of macro-
prudential assessment based to a significant extent
on the kind of data in national balance sheets dis-
cussed above.
Perhaps the most interesting of the Report’s
remarks on banking regulation and supervision
(para. 97) concern countries where the supervisory
regime is not adequate or supervisory resources are
scarce. Here the Report draws attention to the possi-
bility of using “a set of more explicit regulations
dealing notably with liquidity and foreign exchange
exposures”. These include the following:
(i) limits could be placed on open long or short
positions in foreign currencies as a percentage
of capital;
(ii) minimum holdings of liquid assets, meeting a
well-defined criterion, could be required in or-
der to provide sufficiently for liquidity risk
arising from foreign currency liabilities;
(iii) requirements could be tiered so that lower re-
serve/liquidity ratios apply to long-term foreign
currency borrowings;
(iv) reserve requirements, with or without remunera-
tion, could be imposed to discourage foreign
currency funding;
(v) regulations could require banks to match fund
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ties, and more stringent, minimum maturities
could be imposed on foreign currency funding;
(vi) regulations could require banks to hedge their
foreign currency risk exposure in transactions
and to ensure that their borrowers hedge their
exposure as a condition for obtaining loans from
banks; and
(vii) to lower credit risk, foreign currency loans could
be restricted to a fixed percentage of capital, or
banks could be required to hold more capital
and/or loan-loss reserves against these loans.
What is particularly striking about these rec-
ommendations is that they might be classified as
capital controls. Like those on capital controls as
prudential measures discussed below, these recom-
mendations are an indication of the increasing
back-door acceptability of such controls, but also
seem to reflect a certain continuing reluctance to clas-
sify them as part of the panoply of appropriate
instruments of macroeconomic policy.
C. The non-bank financial and corporate
sectors
Under this heading the Report includes finan-
cial institutions not classified as banks (such as
finance companies in Thailand or merchant banks in
the Republic of Korea) as well as non-financial firms.
With regard to the former the Report largely limits
itself to endorsement of international initiatives al-
ready under way. With regard to the latter its
recommendations include appropriate levels of lev-
erage, better corporate governance and disclosure,
and the avoidance of incentives to short-term bor-
rowing in the government’s regime for capital
transactions. The Report notes the desirability of in-
formation on non-financial corporations’ exposure
to financial risks as part of the national balance-sheet
data at the core of the Report’s approach to the
monitoring and managing of such risks. But it ac-
knowledges that in many countries this would require
radical changes in the regimes of financial reporting
for such firms.
D. Capital controls as “a prudential
measure”
Attention was drawn earlier to the way in which
discussion of capital controls is relegated in the Re-
port to the heading of prudential measures, rather
than being taken up as a major instrument for the
management of economy-wide risks by the public
sector. Both the classification of certain capital con-
trols as being of a prudential nature and the Report’s
exclusion of controls on capital outflows from its
purview are worthy of further comment.
Deregulation of the banking industry since the
1970s has been associated with the relaxation of of-
ficial controls over key financial indicators, such as
interest rates, and with the decartelization of the
markets for various banking services, as a result partly
of government policy and partly of competitive pres-
sures driven by technology. The policy response to
the increased risks due to deregulation has included
strengthening of prudential regulation and supervi-
sion, particularly in the form of a better alignment of
prices and costs in banking operations with the risks
involved, of higher levels of capital to meet unex-
pected losses, and of improved guidelines for, and
supervision of, banks’ own internal control of risk.
Many of the measures of this prudential regulation
are in the form of rules about different components
of banks’ balance sheets such as requirements for
minimum levels of capital or liquidity. Measures of
this kind overlap with certain instruments of mon-
etary policy which may involve rules about the
minimum levels of liquid assets to be held by banks,
or the rates of interest at which the monetary author-
ity is prepared to engage in repo operations,12 or other
short-term borrowing from and lending to banks and
other agents in the financial markets (thus influenc-
ing their liquidity).
Such overlapping makes it difficult in many
areas to draw a precisely located line between meas-
ures of monetary policy, on the one hand, and of
prudential regulation of financial firms, on the other
(a difficulty which need not be all that surprising
since the major objectives of policies under both
headings include systemic stability). The EEC
directive of 1972, discussed in section A above,
exemplifies this statement, since the instruments of
policy recommended therein for “effective regula-
tion of capital flows” and for “neutralization of those
effects produced by international capital flows on
domestic liquidity which are considered undesirable”
are presented as components of macroeconomic
policy but evidently would also have prudential im-
plications for banks. Classification of capital controls
as prudential measures fits quite naturally into a
conceptual framework which acknowledges this
overlapping, since it involves the extension of the
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ance sheet as a whole, and in many cases13 the con-
trols might anyway consist of rules for the balance
sheets of financial firms which could also be classi-
fied as “prudential” in the narrower, traditional sense.
The Report justifies the exclusion of controls
over capital outflows from its purview on the grounds
that these “should be thought of more as an element
of crisis management and, as such, are beyond the
scope of this paper”. However, the Report does not
define what it means by controls on capital outflows.
Indeed, some of the controls it endorses (such as some
of those recommended for economies with weak
regulation and supervision – see section B above –
or the minimum holding period for direct and port-
folio investment from abroad in Chile’s regime for
capital transactions) might be classified as controls
over outflows. The key to understanding what con-
trols the Report is prepared to endorse in appropriate
circumstances may lie in the meaning it intends to
give to the term “market-based regulations”. If these
are understood to be measures affecting incentives
to lend or invest through their impact on the costs or
other terms of the contracts in question, then such
measures can be considered as being directed at the
economic decision leading to capital inflows, and in
this sense as controls over them. If this interpreta-
tion is correct, then the controls over capital outflows
which the Report omits from its discussion are mainly
those involving direct restrictions on, or prohibition
of, capital transfers from residents to non-residents.
V. Building institutional capacity
Under this heading the Report begins with the
markets needed “if market participants are to evalu-
ate and manage risks” (para. 119). Here it singles
out the development of domestic bond markets, the
importance of well-functioning equity markets, and
increased use of derivative instruments provided ei-
ther by domestic or by international institutions and
markets.
The Report’s treatment of these issues is sum-
mary. The development of domestic bond markets,
which is currently being strongly promoted by some
international institutions,14 is to provide an alterna-
tive source of financing to domestic bank-lending,
especially in times of financial stress.15 But this raises
the question of how far domestically issued bonds
could be expected to replace borrowing from banks
at such times and thus contribute to preventing cri-
ses in the banking sector becoming more generalized
financial crises and to facilitating exit from them.
Moreover, the Report does not take up the important
question of foreign access to domestic bond markets.
It might be argued that so long as bonds are de-
nominated in domestic currency, during crises
characterized by rises in interest rates foreign inves-
tors would be discouraged by the fall in the price of
bonds in that currency from liquidating their posi-
tions, thus reducing pressures for depreciation.
However, actual experience of links between out-
flows of foreign investment from equity markets
(where assets are also denominated in the local cur-
rency) and pressures on currencies during crises in
emerging-market countries does not offer grounds
for much optimism on this score.
Derivative instruments can of course serve im-
portant functions for the purpose of risk management.
But the Report’s blanket endorsement ignores their
potential for also being a source of problems for both
economic agents and supervisors. It might have been
more appropriate if a working group of a body in-
tended to foster financial stability had advocated
expanded use of derivatives only subject to a rea-
sonable expectation that economic actors were
capable of exercising effective internal control over
such instruments as well as to the existence of ad-
equate capacity for supervising their use.
The remainder of the section on building
institutional capacity focusses principally on the
transparency of the public sector, where its recom-
mendations are closely connected to those on the need
for comprehensive national balance-sheet data,
including those of the public sector (discussed in
section IV above), and on the development of capac-
ity in the areas of bank regulation and supervision
and of private risk management. Favourable refer-
ence is made in the latter context to the joint IMF/
World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Programme
(FSAP). The FSAP was established as part of the
initiatives on standard-setting in the context of
international financial reform, and is currently op-
erating on a trial basis in countries which have
volunteered to participate. The emphasis of the Re-
port is more on the FSAP’s contribution to identifying
and remedying vulnerabilities in the financial sector
than on its role in the assessment of compliance with
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VI. Data on external financial
positions
This section of the Report addresses various
shortcomings in statistical reporting systems revealed
by recent financial crises and refers to requirements
under this heading in creditor as well as debtor coun-
tries. Much of the discussion concerns initiatives
already under way for improvements in data on ex-
ternal debt, foreign exchange reserves, and the
international investment position (IIP, the balance
sheet of a country’s external financial assets and li-
abilities), and various suggestions are made as to
ways in which these initiatives could be usefully
extended. References are made to improving the pe-
riodicity of data but on the whole the improvements
discussed, while making possible better and more
timely analysis of country risk, would still fall short
of those required to deal with many of the kinds of
financial stress which countries may now experience
as a result of the increased integration of financial
markets (some instances of which were mentioned
above in section III).
A crucial requirement in this context is the
monitoring of various assets, liabilities and related
items, including the large positions of private eco-
nomic agents, on a short-term basis. Here the main
progress mentioned in the Report concerns the new
template for a country’s international reserves which
has been incorporated in the IMF’s Special Data Dis-
semination Standard (SDDS), and under which
subscribers will disseminate data on reserves and
related items (including actual and potential short-
term obligations) on a monthly basis, with a lag of
no more than one month. With respect to private eco-
nomic agents’ large positions, the Report notes
(para. 150) that:
With the assistance of the IMF, systems for
high frequency monitoring of the external li-
abilities of domestic financial institutions were
established in a small number of countries to
expand their capacity to manage crises and to
provide early warning of emerging problems.
The coverage of the monitoring systems has
been limited to interbank transactions of
domestic banks (including their offshore
branches and subsidiaries) vis-à-vis foreign
banks. The monitoring systems typically cover
a large proportion of the domestic banking
sector and entail the collection of weekly in-
formation, with reports on roll-over rates,
changes in exposure, changes in average ma-
turity, and changes in spreads.
Such monitoring would appear to represent progress
in the direction of a form of reporting which could
assist a country’s authorities in anticipating and man-
aging periods of financial stress. However, the Report
is tantalizingly lacking in detail concerning how these
systems of high- frequency monitoring work. Moreo-
ver, the monitoring does not seem to include the
exposures of non-bank financial firms (a category
which would comprise the hedge funds whose ac-
tivities have been a subject of concern for a number
of Asian countries since the region’s financial cri-
sis), and falls short of the demands for improved
disclosure now being debated in some countries.16
Initiatives going beyond the high frequency-
monitory mentioned above have been under discus-
sion in working groups of the Committee on the
Global Financial System. One of these, that on Trans-
parency Regarding Aggregate Positions (the Patat
Group), had a mandate to look at what aggregate data
on financial markets could be collected to enhance
their efficient operation. The second, that on Trans-
parency Regarding Individual Positions (the Fisher
Group), is concerned with ways in which large fi-
nancial institutions, including non-banks, might be
encouraged on a voluntary basis to make available
to clients and lenders a greater range of information
on their risk profiles in the interest of improving sys-
temic stability, removing, for example, threats to li-
quidity or to institutions’ access to financing resulting
from inadequate information. The initiative involv-
ing the Patat Group appears to have been abandoned
because of the finding that “it would not be possible
to obtain adequately comprehensive and timely in-
formation on a voluntary basis, and legislative solu-
tions were deemed impractical” (White, 2000: 22).
Neither of these initiatives is mentioned in the Re-
port. Moreover, the possibility of alternative initia-
tives on the part of individual countries concerned
by their lack of such information is not raised. These
might take the form, for example, of the removal in a
country’s regulations of various legal protections
from transactions between its domestic entities and
foreign counterparties which refused to provide such
information. In this context a point made by a well-
known authority on banking issues is worthy of re-
call: “markets do not create the legal order; the legal
order enables the markets … The felt need of the
participants [in the markets] is for ‘legal certainty’.
A price can be charged for that” (Mayer, 1999: 48).11 Commentary on the Financial Stability Forum’s Report of the Working Group on Capital Flows
VII. Concluding remarks
An important departure of this Report is its at-
tempt to confront policy problems connected to the
multiplication of fault lines in the global network of
financial markets that has resulted from greater inte-
gration and the proliferation among financial firms
of new techniques for managing cross-border expo-
sures to financial risk. The Report’s main weakness
is its inadequate treatment of features of the behav-
iour of international investors and lenders, as opposed
to that of borrowers and other recipients of capital
flows, as well as of rules in the countries where the
former operate. No doubt this can be explained to a
significant extent by the mandate of the Financial
Stability Forum’s Working Group on Capital Flows,
which had the effect of diverting its attention from
global macroeconomic factors driving capital flows.
But this weakness may also reflect a widespread as-
sumption in lending and investing countries that the
main flaws of the otherwise largely beneficial sys-
tem of international capital movements which has
come into existence since the 1960s are to be found
in weaknesses in recipient countries, which should
therefore be responsible for the lion’s share of the
adjustments needed to reduce the likelihood of fi-
nancial crises. Thus, a major aim of this commentary
has been to indicate ways in which the Report’s set
of recommendations are connected to a perception
of problems inherent in the existing regime for capi-
tal flows that is, in significant respects, partial and
one-sided.
Notes
1 The reasons for these difficulties are spelt out at some
length in CGFS (1999: 15) – which relied partly on inter-
views with market participants in a number of financial
centres – as follows:  “By their nature, some … market
risk control tools have the potential to tighten links across
markets and to alter price dynamics. As one example, the
strategy termed proxy hedging led traders to use major
national markets to offset positions in thin markets that
might have been difficult to liquidate quickly. Complaints
about such practices surfaced regarding asset prices in
Australia and Hong Kong at the time that the Asia crisis
broke in 1997. When considering the events of August
and September 1998, market participants reported that as
financial conditions in Russia deteriorated, short positions
in both Hungarian and Brazilian debt, which offer rela-
tively deep markets, were put in place to hedge against
long positions in Russian securities. Even mature markets
were not immune. In European markets, a broad range of
assets was hedged by the highly liquid bund futures con-
tract, triggering market pressures when spreads between
these securities and bunds widened. ... In particular, as
decisions on exposure limits shifted toward senior man-
agers as stresses mounted, losses in one market, because
they reduced the overall amount of capital, then prompted
withdrawals from other markets. In that sense, the events
of last fall mimicked those of a traditional margin call,
albeit on a worldwide scale, as positions in a variety of
markets were unloaded as a result of losses originally con-
centrated in a few.”
2 For a survey of banks’ financial reporting and of their
returns to central banks or financial regulators in
23 (mainly industrial) countries in the early 1990s see
Cornford (1999).
3 Segmental reporting denotes reporting of turnover and
other results and of assets and liabilities by class of busi-
ness and geographical area.
4 An instructive example of the problems caused by indi-
rect exposure to the Russian Federation during the 1998
crisis is provided by the High-Risk Opportunities fund
(HRO), part of a family of funds called III Offshore Advi-
sors. HRO had hedged the currency risk of its exposure in
the market for Russian GKOs (short-term government debt
instruments) with a number of major banks which had
hedged their exposure in the Russian domestic market.
However, after the Russian Federation’s declaration of a
moratorium on selected external obligations, these banks
were unable to realize the monies due to them on their
Russian hedges, and in turn reneged on their obligations
to HRO, which was forced into liquidation (Dunbar, 2000:
201–202).
5 Stress-testing and scenario analysis refer to techniques used
to identify and estimate the effects of extreme events, such
as major adverse shocks to the balance of payments (in
the case of a country) or large losses due, for example, to
stock-market crashes (in the case of financial firms).
6 Market intelligence would appear to be an important part
of the basis of allegations by certain Asian countries con-
cerning the recent contribution of hedge funds to instabil-
ity in currency and certain other financial markets. See,
for example, Yam (1998) and RBA (1999a, paras. 11–13).
7 Such an approach to capital controls would be also be
consistent with the objective of giving an imprimatur only
to a restricted set of capital controls and to restricted cir-
cumstances, now and in future, in which their use is ap-
propriate.
8 Council directive of 21 March 1972 (72/156/EEC) re-
printed in the Official Journal No. L91/13 of 18 April 1972.
The directive was subsequently repealed in 1988.
9 One correspondent, apparently quoting a Mexican banker,
noted that “The banks sent salesmen to Mexico, not ana-
lysts. Promotions and bonuses resulted from deals and
profits, not from mealymouthed excuses” (Delamaide,
1984: 102).
10 See Zonis and Wilkin (2000). (This article, written by two
members of the Chicago-based political-risk consulting
firm, Marvin Zonis and Associates, contains a useful, if
brief, account of institutional deficiencies in banks’ as-
sessment of country risk.)
11 Concerning the frequency of on-site supervision in the
early 1990s in a sample of 23 (principally industrial coun-
tries) see Cornford (1999, sect. III. B).
12 Repo operations refer to short-term borrowing and lend-
ing collateralized by securities.
13 The measures recommended by the Report for countries
with weak regulation and supervision, which were dis-
cussed in section IV.B above, provide a number of exam-
ples.
14 See, for example, OECD (1999: 61–78), which contains
data on the scale of the bond markets of Asian countries12 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 7
in relation their GDP, as well as a discussion of regula-
tory, tax and institutional features identified as responsi-
ble for holding back their development in these and other
developing countries.
15 This point has been made on a number of occasions by
Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Board of Governors of
the United States Federal Reserve System. See, for exam-
ple, Greenspan (2000), where he said: “These recent cri-
ses have underscored certain financial structure
vulnerabilities that are not readily assuaged in the short
run but, nonetheless, will be increasingly important to
address in any endeavor to build formidable buffers against
financial stress. Among the most important, in my judg-
ment, is the development of alternatives that enable fi-
nancial systems under stress to maintain an adequate de-
gree of financial intermediation even should their main
source of intermediation, whether banks or capital mar-
kets, freeze up in a crisis. The existence of multiple av-
enues of financial intermediation has served the United
States well in recent decades, especially during the credit
crunch of the late 1980s and more recently when our capital
markets froze up in 1998 following the Russian default.”
The view is expressed in OECD (1999: 71) that “The lack
of development of Asia’s local debt market exacerbated
the crisis, as during the financial crisis, there was an abrupt
loss of international market access”. However, it is hard
to believe that the access of borrowers even to a better
developed local bond market could have been largely
maintained in the conditions of a currency-cum-banking
crisis which drastically restricted access to external financ-
ing.
16 See, for example, the following statement in RBA (1999b):
“There is a need for enhanced information … concerning
market concentration. One way of addressing the market
concentration issue is to require some form of large posi-
tion reporting, where large positions are defined in terms
of the relevant market. For example, institutions could be
required to disclose positions that account for more than
some percentage of a market’s turnover or outstanding
contracts. The benchmark levels for disclosure could be
determined by national regulatory agencies, or through
international agreement, perhaps through the BIS. At one
extreme, institutions might be required to notify the au-
thorities of the specific details of positions that exceeded
the relevant benchmark. A less intrusive approach would
be to require some form of public reporting in which in-
stitutions periodically disclose whether they had ‘large’
positions in certain markets, but were not required to dis-
close specific details of those positions.”
References
BCBS (2000). Sound Practices for Managing Liquidity in Bank-
ing Organisations. Basle, Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, February.
BUCKLEY RP (1999). Emerging Markets Debt: An Analysis of
the Secondary Market. The Hague, Kluwer Law Interna-
tional.
CAOUETTE JB, ALTMAN EI and NARAYANAN P (1998).
Managing Credit Risk: The Next Great Financial Chal-
lenge. New York, John Wiley.
CGFS (1999). A Review of Financial Market Events in Autumn
1998. Report of the Committee on the Global Financial
System. Basle, Bank for International Settlements, Octo-
ber.
CORNFORD A (1999). Standards for transparency and bank-
ing regulation and supervision. International Monetary
and Financial Issues for the 1990s, Vol. XI. United Na-
tions publication, sales no. E.99.II.D.25. UNCTAD, New
York and Geneva.
DELAMAIDE D (1984). Debt Shock: The Full Story of the World
Credit Crisis. Garden City, NY, Doubleday and Company.
DUNBAR N (2000). Inventing Money: The Story of Long-Term
Capital Management and the Legend Behind It. Chiches-
ter, UK, John Wiley and Sons.
GREENSPAN A (2000). Speech by the Chairman of the Board
of Governors of the US Federal Reserve System at the
Financial Crisis Conference of the Council on Foreign
Relations, New York, 12 July (reprinted in BIS Review,
14 July 2000).
MATTEN C (2000). Managing Bank Capital: Capital Alloca-
tion and Performance Measurement, second edition.
Chichester, UK, John Wiley and Sons.
MAYER M (1999). Risk reduction in the new financial archi-
tecture: Realities and fallacies in international financial
reform. The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard
College Public Policy Brief No. 56. Annandale-on-Hud-
son, NY.
OECD (1999). Financial Market Trends, No. 74. Paris, Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Oc-
tober.
RBA (1999a). The Impact of Hedge Funds on Financial Mar-
kets. Paper submitted by the Reserve Bank of Australia to
the Australian House of Representatives Standing Com-
mittee on Economics, Finance and Public Administration’s
Inquiry into the International Financial Markets Effects
on Government Policy, Canberra, June.
RBA (1999b). Hedge Funds, Financial Stability and Market
Integrity. Paper submitted by the Reserve Bank of Aus-
tralia to the Australian House of Representatives Stand-
ing Committee on Economics, Finance and Public Ad-
ministration’s Inquiry into the International Financial
Markets Effects on Government Policy. Canberra, June.
WHITE WR (2000). What have we learned from recent finan-
cial crises and policy responses? BIS Working Paper
No. 84, January.
YAM J (1998). Speech by the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong
Monetary Authority, Singapore, 14 October (reprinted in
BIS Review, 23 October 1998).
ZONIS M AND WILKIN S (2000). Crisis management. The
Banker, May.13 Commentary on the Financial Stability Forum’s Report of the Working Group on Capital Flows
G-24 Discussion Paper Series*
Research papers for the Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs
No. 1 March 2000 Arvind PANAGARIYA The Millennium Round and Developing Countries: Nego-
tiating Strategies and Areas of Benefits
No. 2 May 2000 T. Ademola OYEJIDE Interests and Options of Developing and Least-developed
Countries in a New Round of Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions
No. 3 May 2000 Andrew CORNFORD The Basle Committee’s Proposals for Revised Capital
Standards: Rationale, Design and Possible Incidence
No. 4 June 2000 Katharina PISTOR The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing
Economies
No. 5 June 2000 Andrés VELASCO Exchange-rate Policies for Developing Countries: What
Have We Learned?  What Do We Still Not Know?
No. 6 August 2000 Devesh KAPUR and Governance-related Conditionalities of the International
Richard WEBB Financial Institutions
* G-24 Discussion Paper Series are available on the website at: http://www.unctad.org/en/pub/pubframe.htm. Copies of
G-24 Discussion Paper Series may be obtained from c/o Editorial Assistant, Macroeconomic and Development Policies Branch,
Division on Globalization and Development Strategies, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Palais
des Nations, CH-1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland; Tel. (+41-22) 907.5733; Fax (+41-22) 907.0274; E-mail: nicole.winch@unctad.org